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Monetary Policy
in a Low Inflation Regime
This Weekly Letter is adapted from the discus-
sion at the Conference on Monetary Policy in a
Low Inflation Regime held on March 4 and 5,
1994. The conference was jointly sponsored by
the Center for Economic Policy Research at Stan-
ford University and the Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco.
Over the last few years, the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem has pursued a policy of gradual disinflation,
with a goal of eventually achieving "price sta-
bility." The rationale for this policy is a belief that
inflation is costly, even at moderate rates. For
example, inflation increases uncertainty about
long-term financial plans and encourages indi-
viduals to economize unnecessarily on the use of
money. Lasting price stability would benefit soci-
ety by reducing these inefficiencies.
On the other hand, achieving price stability may
be costly. A commitment to price stability may
entail a loss of flexibility in conducting counter-
cyclical policy. And the transition to price stabil-
ity may be costly if the public doubts that it is in
the central bank's best interests to see it through.
Finding ways to increase the credibility of a z~ro­
inflation policy would reduce the transitional
costs.
This Letter reviews some recent research on the
costs and benefits of reducing inflation (see the
listof Conference Papers below). Before proceed-
ing, it is worth clarifying a semantic point. When
we speak of price stability, we do not mean a
constant value for an index like the CPI. Price in-
dices measure the price level with error, and it is
widely believed that these errors impart an up-
ward bias to measured inflation rates. Although
the precise magnitude of this bias is unknown,
William Poole suggests that measured inflation of
up to 2 percent might be consistent with price
stability. Since (PI inflation is currently around 3
percent, the relevant policy question is whether
to reduce itto 1 or 2 percent.
Benefits of price stability
Money facilitates exchange and therefore frees up
resources for other uses. Anticipated inflation op-
erates like a tax on money, because the real value
of money falls as prices rise, and thus encourages
individuals to economize on its use. In high-
inflation economies, individuals devote a sub-
stantial amount of time to managing their money,
and the financial sector employs many talented
people to help. Thus anticipated inflation im-
poses a cost on society by drawing resources
into the financial sector and away from other
productive activities.
Robert Lucas's paper argues that this cost may be
substantial. His estimates suggest that reducing
inflation from 5 percent to zero would yield an
annual benefit of roughly 0.25 to 0.5 percent of
GDP. Since U.S. GDP is approximately $6 tril-
lion, the current "zero inflation dividend" would
amount to roughly $15 to $30 billion.
Lucas also argues that driving the inflation rate
below zero may yield further significant divi-
dends. The optimal inflation rate, according to
Milton Friedman. is the one that minimizes the
opportunity cost'of holding money. If money pays
no interest, this occurs when the nominal interest
rate is zero. Many economists believe that the
annual dividend earned by going from zero infla-
tion to Friedman's optimal rate would be very
small, but Lucas estimates that this would yield
an annual dividend of roughly $36 billion.
In one respect, Lucas's estimates may be too
high. His calculations are predicated on the as-
sumption that money pays no interest. If money
did pay interest, the costs of steady inflation
would be substantially reduced, because interest
payments would reduce the opportunity cost of
holding money for any given inflation rate and
thus mitigate the effects of the inflation tax. Since
most M1 instruments pay explicit or implicit in-
terest, evidence based on M1 may overstate the
costs of steady inflation.FRBSF
In another respect, Lucas's estimates may un-
derstate the costs of steady inflation. While his
model implies that inflation permanently lowers
the level of output, it also implies that inflation
has no long-run effect on its growth rate. But if
inflation draws resources out of the research sec-
tor as well as the goods sector, it may adversely
affect the pace of technical progress and reduce
the economy's long-run growth rate as well.
Technical progress is an important engine of
growth, but it does not rain down like manna
from heaven. An economy is likely to grow more
slowly if talented individuals devote their energy
to money management rather than to developing
new goods or more productive ways to produce
existing goods.
Brian Motley attempts to quantify the effect of
inflation on long-run growth by examining statis-
tical evidence from a cross section of countries,
and he finds that high-inflation countries do
tend to grow more slowly. For example, for OECD
countries, his results suggest that reducing infla-
tion from 10 to 5 percent would increase steady
state output growth by 0.5 to 0.75 percentage
points, although the effect would be smaller in
the medium term. Since the increase in growth
would accumulate year after year, if would ulti-
mately yield huge increases in the level of in-
come. For example, if the baseline growth rate
were 2 percent, the steady state level of income
would increase by 11 to 16 percent after 20 years
and by 22 to 35 percent after 40 years. On the
other hand, Motley finds that in advanced coun-
tries the gro'lJth effects associated vvith disinfla-
tion below 5 percent are rather small. For OECD
countries, his estimates suggest that reducing
inflation from 5 percent to zero would have a
negligible effect on long-run growth.
Motley's results are subject to two caveats. First,
as in any statistical research, it is difficult to in-
terpret correlation in terms of causation. For ex-
ample, a negative relation between growth and
inflation could also result from adverse aggregate
supply shocks. Second, his estimates are on the
high end of the empirical range. Other research-
ers have had difficulty finding growth effects of
this magnitude. Of course, since financial serv-
ices add to measured GOp, an increase in fi-
nancial activity might offset adverse effects on
non-financial activity, thus making it difficult to
detect the effect of inflation on GOP growth.
Finally, while Lucas and Motley both concentrate
on the costs of anticipated inflation, many econ-
omistsbelieve that unexpected inflation is far
more costly because it increases uncertainty
about long-term financial plans. Unexpected in-
flation randomly redistributes wealth between
borrowers and lenders. Furthermore, there is a
positive relation between the level and variability
of inflation, so high-inflation economies also tend
to subject to greater inflation uncertainty. While
the causal mechanism underlying this relation is
not well understood, there is a common belief
among economists that a commitment to price
stability would reduce the degree of inflation
uncertainty. The most important benefit of price
stability may be that it would facilitate long-term
financial planning.
The effects of inflation uncertainty could also be
mitigated if investors were able to trade securities
whose interest and principal were indexed to in-
flation. For example, Chairman Greenspan has
proposed that the Treasury issue indexed bonds.
Robert Shiller has proposed that private markets
be established to trade derivative securities that
would provide insurance against inflation risk.
According to Shiller's plan, individuals seeking to
reduce their exposure to inflation risk would pur-
chase a security whose dividend is proportional
to the realized value of some price index. If infla-
tion turned out to be higher than expected, their
insurance dividend would also be higher than
expected, and this gain would partially offset
losses on nominal assets. On the other side of the
market, an investor would agree to pay these div-
idends, and thus bear the inflation risk, in ex-
change for some payment. The same principle
could also be applied to create derivative secu-
rities that would hedge occupational, regional, or
national income risks.
While these proposals are attractive in principle,
they do not yet represent a practical alternative
to priCe stability, since the proposed hedging in-
struments do not currently trade in the United
States.
Transitional costs ofdisinflation
The transition to price stability is likely to be
costly because it may involve a period of slower
growth and higher unemployment. The magni-
tude of the transitional cost depends on the
extent to which the central bank can influence
inflationary expectations. Disinflation is more
costly when it comes as a surprise. If workers
and firms expect high inflation, they will strike
nominal wage bargains that reflect those fore-
casts. Then, if inflation turns out to be lower thanexpected, real wages will be too high, and un-
employment will rise. On the other hand, if
workers and firms expect inflation to fall, they
will incorporate those forecasts into their nomi-
nal wage bargains, and the central bank may be
able to reduce inflation without increasing un-
employment. Thus the transitional costs of disin-
flation can be reduced if the central bank can
reduce inflationary expectations.
However, the central bank cannot reduce infla-
tionary expectations merely by promising to
reduce inflation. The public must also believe
that it is in the central bank's best interest to
carry out its promise. Guy Debelle and Stanley
Fischer point out that the relations between the
government and the central bank are an impor-
tant ingredient in achieving credibility. They
argue that granting central banks the power to
set policy goals is not sufficient, and may even
be counterproductive. For example, the Russian
central bank is independent and yet has chosen a
hyperinflationary policy. The government can
more effectively enhance the central bank's cred-
ibility by providing it with a clear mandate about
the goals of monetary policy, by granting it the
independence to choose how to achieve those
goals, and by making it accountable for its per-
formance. If the government rewards the central
bank for achieving and maintaining price sta-
bility, then price setters will understand that it is
in the central bank's best interests to reduce in-
flation and to keep it low, and this may reduce
the transitional costs of disinflation.
Costs of price stability
Another potential drawback to price stability is
that the central bank may lose some flexibility in
conducting stabilization policy. With a positive
average inflation rate, the central bank can re-
spond aggressively to adverse aggregate demand
shocks by driving short-term nominal interest
rates below the expected inflation rate, thus
making short-term real interest rates negative
and giving the economy a sharp countercyclical
stimulus. In a zero-inflation regime, short-term
nominal interest rates would already be low, thus
limiting the extent to which the central bank
could reduce short-term real interest rates. In
principle, this may limit the central bank's ability
to respond to contractionary aggregate demand
shocks.
Jeffrey Fuhrer and Brian Madigan investigate
whether this constraint is likely to be important
in practice. In the context of a sticky price ra-
tional expectations model, they show that the
central bank retains enough leverage over short-
term real interest rates to cushion the economy
against most adverse demand shocks. However,
when adverse demand shocks are large and are
expected to persist a few quarters, the zero
bound on nominal interest rates may prevent the
central bank from easing as aggressively as it
would in a moderate inflation regime. If large,
persistent contractions in aggregate demand oc-
cur frequently, then the zero bound on nominal
interest rates would be an important constraint
on stabilization policy. If not, then this constraint
would have little practical importance.
Conclusion
There was a broad consensus among the confer-
ence participants that a return to inflation rates of
5 to 10 percent would be undesirable, but there
was less consensus on whether further disinfla-
tion is desirable. Proponents of disinflation argue
that inflation is costly even at low rates, primarily
because it generates uncertainty about long-term
financial plans. Opponents of disinflation em-
phasize that it may have large transitional costs.
Policymakers do not have the luxury of waiting
for a definitive resolution of this debate and
therefore must choose a course of action based
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